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COMMONWEALTH V. LIVELY: PENNSYLVANIA IMPOSES
LIMITATIONS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY




Often in criminal trials, a crucial witness gives testimony on the
stand that is contradictory to a statement the witness made on some pre-
vious occasion.' These contradictory out-of-court statements are called
prior inconsistent statements.2 Generally, hearsay rules ban the sub-
stantive use of these contrary out-of-court statements. 3 Thus, without
an evidentiary rule immunizing prior inconsistent statements from the
effect of the hearsay rules, a party "who has had the misfortune of hav-
ing his [or her] crucial witness persuaded, suborned, seduced, or intimi-
dated into changing his [or her] story" is left with very little recourse.
4
Until recently, Pennsylvania litigants found their recourse in the
Brady rule. 5 As set forth in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's landmark
evidentiary decision, Commonwealth v. Brady, the Brady rule permitted
prior inconsistent statements of non-party witnesses to be introduced as
substantive evidence at trial if the witness testified in court and was avail-
able for cross-examination. 6 However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
1. Charles T. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substan-
tive Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REV. 574, 575 (1947) [hereinafter McCormick, The Turn-
coat Witness].
2. Id. Inconsistencies can range from minor discrepancies between the wit-
ness' in-court and out-of-court statements to denials that the out-of-court state-
ment was ever made. In Pennsylvania, the similarities between the in-court and
out-of-court statements "must be substantial enough to cast doubt on a wit-
ness's testimony" for the statement to be considered "inconsistent." Common-
wealth v. Bailey, 469 A.2d 604, 611 (Pa. 1983). The Federal Rules of Evidence
do not provide an explicit test for "inconsistency."
3. See FED. R. EvID. 802 (stating that out-of-court statements offered for
truth of matter asserted are not admissible except as provided by evidentiary
rule or statute).
4. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness, supra note 1, at 575.
5. Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66, 67 (Pa. 1986). The Brady rule
stated that prior inconsistent statements "may be used as substantive evidence
where the declarant is a witness at trial and available for cross-examination." Id.
For a discussion of the Brady decision, see infra notes 55-62 and accompanying
text. For an in-depth discussion of the Brady decision, see generally Jennifer
Hilliard, Note, Substantive Admissibility of a Non-Party Witness' Prior Inconsistent State-
ments: Pennsylvania Adopts the Modern View, 32 VILL. L. REV. 470 (1987).
6. Brady, 507 A.2d at 67. Prior to Brady, prior inconsistent statements could
be used only to impeach witnesses. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waller, 444 A.2d
653, 656 (Pa. 1982) (noting Pennsylvania law permits introduction of prior in-
consistent statements solely for impeachment purposes); Commonwealth v.
(285)
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recently revisited the issue of prior inconsistent statement admissibility
in Commonwealth v. Lively.
7
In Lively, appellant Kevin Lively was convicted of first-degree mur-
der 8 for fatally wounding a man who had smashed the rear window of
Lively's automobile. 9 Part of the substantive evidence the jury consid-
ered in convicting Lively were the prior inconsistent statements of three
Commonwealth witnesses who testified at Lively's trial.' 0 The Com-
monwealth introduced two of these statements through the testimony of
local police officers, who detailed their recollections of conversations
they had allegedly had with the witnesses." I The trial court admitted all
three statements as substantive evidence and all three contributed, in
whole or part, to Kevin Lively's murder conviction and life sentence.'
2
Gee, 354 A.2d 875, 880 & n.5 (criticizing Pennsylvania's adherence to orthodox
rule, which restricts use of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment); Com-
monwealth v. Tucker, 307 A.2d 245, 248 (Pa. 1973) (same).
7. 610 A.2d 7, 8 (Pa. 1992).
8. Id. at 8. Kevin Lively was also convicted of possession of an instrument
of crime. Id.
9. Id. On April 13, 1986, Kevin Lively caught Tyrone Miller vandalizing
Lively's automobile. Id. Angered, Lively grabbed a gun from the trunk of his
car and began chasing Miller and firing shots at him. d. Although Lively fol-
lowed Miller for a distance, none of the shots Lively fired actually hit Miller. Id.
The next day, however, Lively had a second encounter with Miller and, this time,
Lively shot Miller in the back. Id. Miller died from the gunshot wound. Id.
10. Id. Lively was tried twice before he was convicted for Tyrone Miller's
murder. Id. His first trial, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County, ended when the court granted the defense's motion for mistrial on the
basis of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. Subsequently, before his second trial,
Lively made an unsuccessful attempt to avoid retrial by asserting a double jeop-
ardy claim. Id. After his motion to dismiss failed, Lively was retried, convicted,
and sentenced for first degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime.
Id. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed Lively's sentence. Id. at 9.
11. Id. at 9. The Commonwealth introduced the first prior inconsistent
statement, that of Diane Rucker, through the testimony of Officer Fleming. Id.
Officer Fleming testified at trial about an alleged telephone conversation he had
had with witness Diane Rucker in which she had identified Lively as Tyrone
Miller's killer. Id. at 10. The conversation was neither recorded nor reduced to
a signed writing. Id. On the stand, Ms. Rucker denied ever having had such a
conversation with Officer Fleming. Id. at 9.
Detective Rocks testified about the substance of the second prior inconsis-
tent statement, that made by witness John Moody. Id. at 10. The Common-
wealth introduced John Moody's alleged prior inconsistent statement in the
form of a memorandum that Detective Rocks had prepared. Id. at 10. This
memorandum consisted of Detective Rocks' recollection of statements Moody
had allegedly made during an interview with Mr. Rocks. Id. For further discus-
sion of the prior inconsistent statements the Commonwealth used as substantive
evidence in Lively, see infra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
12. Lively, 610 A.2d at 10. (noting that jury was permitted to consider
"these various alleged unrecorded non-verbatim prior statements" as substan-
tive evidence). On appeal, Lively contended that his constitutional right to due
process had been violated because the prosecution had based its entire case on
prior inconsistent statements admitted as substantive evidence. Id. at 11 n.2 (cit-
ing Appellant's Brief at 2-3). However, because the Pennsylvania Supreme
2
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On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed Kevin
Lively's murder conviction and imposed limitations on its holding in
Brady.' 3 Specifically, the Lively court held that a prior inconsistent state-
ment of a non-party witness "may be used as substantive evidence only
when the statement is given under oath at a formal legal proceeding; or
the statement had been reduced to a writing signed and adopted by the
witness; or a statement that is a contemporaneous verbatim recording of
the witness' statements."1
4
This Note begins with a general discussion of the hearsay dangers
that prior inconsistent statements pose when they are introduced as sub-
stantive evidence in criminal trials.' 5 Part II summarizes the conten-
tions of two major groups of commentators concerning the reliability of
prior inconsistent statements.16 This section also discusses the constitu-
tional issues associated with the introduction of these statements as sub-
stantive evidence at trial. Next, Parts III and IV trace the evolution of
Pennsylvania law concerning the admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments as substantive evidence. This discussion begins in Part III with an
analysis of the Brady decision 17 and the lower court decisions following
Brady,' 8 and ends in Part IV with an analysis of the Lively decision. 19
Part V discusses the guidelines the federal and state courts have adopted
to assess the reliability of prior inconsistent statements and exclude un-
reliable statements from evidence.
20
Finally, this Note suggests that the Lively decision will be a valuable
guide to the Pennsylvania lower courts as an evidentiary "checklist,"
Court determined that the introduction of the prior inconsistent statements of
two of the Commonwealth's witnesses constituted reversible error, the Supreme
Court did not address Lively's constitutional claims. Id. at 11. For a discussion
of the constitutional issues associated with the introduction of prior inconsistent
statements, see infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
13. Lively, 610 A.2d at 10.
14. Id.
15. For a discussion of the hearsay dangers associated with introducing
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence at trial, see infra notes 27-
31 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the viewpoints of the "orthodox" and "modern"
rule proponents regarding prior inconsistent statements, see infra notes 27-32
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the constitutional issues implicated
by the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence at trial, see
infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the Brady decision, see infra notes 55-62 and accom-
panying text.
18. For a discussion of the lower court decisions applying the Brady rule,
see infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the Lively decision, see infra notes 85-118 and ac-
companying text.
20. For a discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), which gov-
erns substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in the federal
courts, see infra notes 132-42 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
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leading to greater consistency in lower court decisions and ensuring that
only statements possessing superior indicia of reliability will be consid-
ered as substantive evidence in criminal trials. However, this Note also
suggests that the Lively court left certain evidentiary questions concern-
ing the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements unanswered. 2 '
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should address these additional issues
to avoid confusion and further ensure that only reliable prior inconsis-
tent statements are admissible at trial.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Guaranteeing the Reliability of Prior Inconsistent Statements. The Orthodox
Rule Versus the Modern Rule
Hearsay is generally defined as an out-of-court assertion offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.2 2 American
courts have never categorically rejected all hearsay evidence.2 3 There
once was a time when parties could use hearsay evidence at trial without
condition.2 4 However, today hearsay evidence must fall within an enu-
merated list of carefully circumscribed exceptions to be admissible in
court.2 5 Jurisdictions generally allow exceptions to the hearsay rule
when "the proffered evidence has satisfied both a guarantee of trustwor-
thiness and a requirement of necessity."'26
Legal scholars have long debated the prudence of admitting prior
inconsistent statements of in-court witnesses as substantive evidence.2 7
Proponents of the orthodox rule, which precludes the substantive ad-
missibility of prior inconsistent statements, argue that courts should not
21. For a discussion of the evidentiary issues the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court failed to address in Lively, see infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
22. Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (c) provides in pertinent part: " 'Hearsay'
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing; offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED.
R. EvID. 801(c).
23. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 179 (1948) [hereinafter Morgan, Hearsay Dangers].
It was not until the latter half of the sixteenth century that commentators began
criticizing the use of hearsay evidence in court. Id. at 181. At that time, the
Anglo-Norman "inquisitorial system of litigation" ended, the adversarial system
was established, and "the rule rejecting hearsay was . . . adopted." Id.
24. Id. at 181.
25. See FED. R. EvID. 803 (enumerating hearsay exceptions where declarant
is available as witness); FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (enumerating hearsay exceptions
where declarant is unavailable as witness at trial).
26. John M. Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes a Compromis-
ing Step Backward in Enacting Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 251, 265
(1977) (citations omitted) (asserting that "trustworthiness" of prior inconsistent
statements "mandate[s] that such statements be given substantive effect").
27. See Michael H. Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements For Impeachment
and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules
of Evidence, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1565, 1568-74 (discussing debate on wisdom of
admitting prior inconsistent statements substantively) (1977).
288 [Vol. 38: p. 285
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admit these statements as substantive evidence because the statements
are not trustworthy.28 These proponents assert three reasons for this
belief: "(1) the statement[s] [were] not made under oath, (2) the trier of
fact did not observe the declarant's demeanor at the time the state-
ment[s] [were] made, and (3) the declarant was not subject to contempo-
raneous cross-examination before the trier of fact .... -29 On the other
side of the debate, however, modern rule proponents forcefully argue
that where the witness is under oath and is subject to cross-examination
at the present trial, these hearsay concerns do not exist.30 Accordingly,
these proponents contend that under these conditions courts should ad-
mit prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. 3 ' Today, the
28. See Walker J. Blakely, You Can Say That If You Want-The Redefintion of
Hearsay in Rule 801 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 601,
623-24 (1974) (asserting that rule permitting use of prior inconsistent state-
ments leads to abuse by those obtaining statements because declarants may be
coerced into signing statements out of "fear, indifference, or ignorance"); Mark
Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 361, 368 (1974) (arguing that prior inconsistent statement's greater proxim-
ity to event in question does not make statement "inherently more reliable").
29. Graham, supra note 27, at 1568 (noting assertions of orthodox
proponents).
30. Id. at 1571. Recognizing the influence of these legal scholars, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Brady stated that "[e]ach prong of this threefold ra-
tionale has been logically and thoroughly debunked by the scholars and by the
growing number of jurisdictions adopting the modern rule governing prior in-
consistent statements of non-party witnesses by statute, rule or case law." Com-
monwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66, 69 (Pa. 1986). The drafters of the federal rule
of evidence governing the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments agreed with the following assertions of the modern rule proponents:
(1) [The] belief that the normal hearsay dangers are largely non-exis-
tent when dealing with prior inconsistent statements where the declar-
ant is in court and may be examined and cross-examined in regard to
his [or her] alleged statement; (2) that the prior statement is more likely
to be true than the testimony of the witness at the trial because [it was]
made nearer in time to the matter to which it relates; (3) that there is a
need to protect counsel from the "turncoat" witness.
Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1973).
In addition, modern rule proponents point out that under the orthodox
rule prior inconsistent statements are not entirely precluded from evidence, but
instead are "accompanied by [a limiting] instruction to the jury to consider the
prior inconsistent statement as bearing solely upon the credibility of the witness'
in-court testimony." Graham, supra note 27, at 1572. Modern rule proponents
assert that this scenario presents the jury with an impossible task. Id. The jury
could hardly help considering the content of a statement as substantive evi-
dence, despite a judge's limiting instruction. Id. at 1572-73; Morgan, Hearsay
Dangers, supra note 23, at 193 (calling practice of admitting statements only for
impeachment purposes a "pious fraud").
31. See McCormick, The Turncoat Witness, supra note 1, at 577 (stating where
declarant is on stand to explain prior inconsistent statement, statement has
equivalent "procedural guaranties [sic] of truth" and "superior" level of trustwor-
thiness to in-court testimony of same witness); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers, supra
note 23, at 192 (asserting that when "[d]eclarant is also a witness, it is difficult to
justify classifying [his or her own prior statements] as hearsay evidence" because
1993] NOTE
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modern rule has gained a stronghold in the majority of jurisdictions,
including the federal courts, where prior inconsistent statements are ad-
missible as substantive evidence if the statements meet certain criteria.3 2
B. Constitutional Implications Regarding the Substantive
Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements
The decision to permit a fact-finder to consider certain prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence while excluding other similar
statements from such consideration involves a balancing test.3 3 In any
criminal trial, there is a strong interest in adjudicating a case on its mer-
its, permitting the fact-finder to consider all the relevant evidence.
3 4
However, balanced against this interest is the defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial.3 5 Because prior inconsistent statements may heavily
influence the fact-finder's decision to convict and, therefore, directly im-
plicate the defendant's constitutional rights, courts are naturally con-
cerned with the reliability of the prior inconsistent statements admitted
into evidence.
3 6
situation does not "involve in substantial degree any of the hearsay risks");
Stalmack, supra note 26, at 255-64 (rebutting rationale of orthodox rule and as-
serting prior inconsistent statements are sufficiently trustworthy and reliable).
32. For a discussion of the rules governing admissibility of prior inconsis-
tent statements in the state and federal courts, see infra notes 127-58 and accom-
panying text.
33. See Brady, 507 A.2d at 70 (weighing hearsay concerns against "integrity
of the fact-finding process").
34. See id. The Brady court noted that "a trial is, fundamentally, a search
for an objective account of the events upon which the criminal charges are
based. An evidentiary rule which forces the searcher to ignore relevant clues
whose reliability can be tested by cross-examination serves no purpose." Id.
(quoting Commonwealth v. Gee, 354 A.2d 875, 886 (1976) (Roberts,J., dissent-
ing)). The Brady court further stated that continued adherence to the orthodox
rule would impede the judicial process because it would serve only "to keep
relevant and reliable evidence from the jury." Id. (quoting Gee, 354 A.2d at 886
(Roberts, J., dissenting)).
35. See Brady, 507 A.2d at 73 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Justice Flaherty
stated that it is "the Commonwealth's obligation to establish ... every element
of the crime with which the defendant is charged." Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted). He further stated, "[i]f the Commonwealth's case is not
substantial enough to stand alone, based on reliable evidence presented here
and now to the court, but instead must rely on the use of prior statements made
out-of-court which are inconsistent with those presently being made in court
.... the case should fail." Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Jus-
tice Flaherty felt that prior inconsistent statements are not trustworthy and that
permitting the fact-finder to consider such statements to be considered as sub-
stantive evidence at trial "works to 'bootstrap' the guilt of the accused." Id. (Fla-
herty, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
36. See, e.g., State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107, 1116 (N.J. 1991). In Mancine,
the NewJersey Supreme Court noted that it is "[b]ecause of the damning nature
of such evidence ... [that] we seek to assure ourselves of the voluntary, reliable
nature of such a statement in any given case." Id. For further discussion of the
New Jersey court's treatment of prior inconsistent statements, see infra notes
153-58 and accompanying text.
290
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Originally, proponents of the orthodox rule asserted that the sub-
stantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements violated a defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.3 7 However, in California
v. Green, the Supreme Court rejected this argument by ruling that the
substantive introduction of prior inconsistent statements did not violate
the Confrontation Clause.38 In Green, defendant Green was convicted of
selling marijuana to a minor chiefly on the basis of out-of-court state-
ments that the minor had made at a preliminary hearing.3 9 The trial
court admitted the minor's prior inconsistent statements pursuant to
California Evidence Code Section 1235, which authorized the substan-
tive admissibility of such statements. 40 On appeal, the California
Supreme Court declared Section 1235 unconstitutional, holding that the
rule violated the Confrontation Clause. 4 ' The California Supreme
Court reasoned that a prior inconsistent statement must be subject to
contemporaneous cross-examination to satisfy the mandates of the Con-
frontation Clause.4 2 The United States Supreme Court disagreed.
43
The Court reversed the California Supreme Court's decision and held
that "the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's
out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness
and subject to full and effective cross-examination."
'44
More recently, critics of the modem rule have raised another consti-
37. See Stanley A. Goldman, Guilt By Intuition: The Insufficiency of Prior Incon-
sistent Statements to Convict, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (1986) (noting that orthodox rule
proponents asserted that inability to cross-examine declarant at time prior in-
consistent statement is made "would not allow adequate confrontation as the
[S]ixth [A]mendment to the United States Constitition requires"). The Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires that "[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause applies
"only to criminal prosecutions." CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 251, at
125 (3d. ed. 1984). Because the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule both
preserve the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him or her, legal
scholars debated whether this overlap meant that a violation of a hearsay rule
would also necessarily constitute a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at
125. The United States Supreme Court's decision in California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970), resolved this issue by determining that, although the "hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values, ... [the Confrontation Clause is not] a codification of the rules of hear-
say and their exceptions .... " Green, 399 U.S. at 155.
38. Green, 399 U.S. at 158-60.
39. Id. at 151-53.
40. Id. at 152.
41. Id. at 153. The California Evidence Code provided that "evidence of a
statement made by a witness is not made admissible by the hearsay rule if the
statement is inconsistent with his [or her] testimony and is offered in compliance
with Section 770." CAL. EvID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). Section 770 required
that the witness be given an opportunity to explain the prior inconsistent state-
ment at trial. CAL. EvID. CODE § 770 (West 1966).
42. Green, 399 U.S. at 153.
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tutional issue regarding the admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments. 4 5 These critics contend that the substantive admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements has due process implications when such
statements are the sole basis of conviction. 4 6 Notably, neither the
United States Supreme Court4 7 nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has decided whether prior inconsistent statements may provide the sole
evidentiary support for a defendant's criminal conviction. 48 Moreover,
the lower federal and state courts decisions on this issue are inconsis-
tent.49 Therefore, because there is no consistent line of legal authority
45. For a discussion of the debate concerning the sufficiency of prior incon-
sistent statements to support a criminal conviction, see generally Goldman, supra
note 37.
46. See Goldman, supra note 37, at 36-37 (discussing due process implica-
tions where prior inconsistent statements provide sole evidentiary basis for con-
viction). Professor Goldman argues that prior inconsistent statements possess
only "minimal guaranteefs] of trustworthiness." Id. at 8. He argues that a pros-
ecutor's ability to cross-examine a declarant concerning a prior inconsistent
statement is severely restricted. Id. at 17. This is because a "hearsay statement
can never be subjected to the same degree of scrutiny through cross-examina-
tion as can live testimony." Id. Therefore, Professor Goldman concludes that
prior inconsistent statements should not provide the sole basis of a criminal de-
fendant's conviction unless "the declarant was subject to some form of cross-
examination by the defendant and... there [is] a reasonable factual basis in the
record for a trier of fact to credit the prior statement" over the present state-
ment. Id. at 44.
47. In California v. Green, however, the Supreme Court observed that "con-
siderations of due process, wholly apart from the Confrontation Clause, might
prevent convictions where a reliable evidentiary basis is totally lacking." 399
U.S. 149, 163 n. 15 (1970). For a discussion of the Green decision, see supra notes
37-44 and accompanying text.
48. The issue of whether a prior inconsistent statement could provide the
sole basis of conviction was raised in Lively. 610 A.2d at 9. However, the Lively
court never reached the issue because it decided that the admission of two of the
prior inconsistent statements constituted a sufficient basis for reversal. Id. at 11.
49. See Goldman, supra note 37, at 23 (noting that "[liower courts have
shown little consistency in their approach to the sufficiency of convictions based
solely on prior inconsistent statements"); see also State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d
1107, 1116 (N.J. 1991) (collecting cases on sufficiency of prior inconsistent
statements to convict). Some jurisdictions have ruled that prior inconsistent
statements cannot comprise the sole substantive evidence to support a defend-
ant's criminal conviction. See United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 118 (6th
Cir. 1979) (stating that when prior inconsistent statements are "only source of
support for the central allegations of [a] charge" the conviction cannot stand);
Brower v. State, 728 P.2d 645 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (finding Orrico reasoning
persuasive in determining prior inconsistent evidence alone not sufficient to
convict); State v. Moore, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1986) (holding prior inconsistent
statement cannot comprise sole basis of conviction because risk of convicting an
innocent person is "too great"); Commonwealth v. Daye, 469 N.E.2d 483, 488
(Mass. 1984) (suggesting in dicta that prior inconsistent statements can provide
sole support for criminal convictions); State v. White Water, 634 P.2d 636, 638
(Mont. 1981) (stating that "a conviction supported only by prior inconsistent
statement should not be allowed to stand"); State v. Maestas, 584 P.2d 182
(N.M. 1978) (holding prior inconsistent statements must be supported by cor-
roborating evidence to be sufficient to convict). Other states have held that
8
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on this issue, the possibility of due process implications where convic-
tions are sustained solely by prior inconsistent statements remains.
III. PENNSYLVANIA'S APPROACH TO THE SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY OF
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
A. The Brady Decision
In 1986, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reconsidered its long-
standing rule that prior inconsistent statements of non-party witnesses
could not be introduced as substantive evidence and thus joined the
growing majority ofjurisdictions that adopted the modern rule. 50 Sev-
eral significant legal events preceded the court's decision. First, in 1970,
the United States Supreme Court, in California v. Green, determined that
the introduction of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence
did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 5 1 Second, in 1975, Congress
enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), which excluded certain
prior inconsistent statements from the definition of hearsay. 52 Rule
801(d)(1)(A) permitted prior inconsistent statements to be introduced
as substantive evidence in the federal courts where the witness was
under oath and subject to cross-examination. 53 Finally, by 1986, at least
forty-one states had reexamined their own evidence rules and had de-
cided to follow Congress' lead by permitting prior inconsistent state-
ments to be used as substantive evidence in their courts. 54
prior inconsistent statements admitted as substantive evidence can sustain a con-
viction because a "jury has the right to rely on such evidence as much as on any
other evidence in the case." Acosta v. State, 417 A.2d 373, 377 (Del. 1980); see
also Montoya v. People, 740 P.2d 992 (Colo. 1987) (permitting witness' prior
inconsistent statement to provide sole evidentiary support for sexual-assault
conviction); Watkins v. State, 446 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1983) (affirming conviction
based solely on prior inconsistent statement); Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107, 1119
(N.J. 1991) (concluding that "substantive elements of a criminal charge may be
proven through a prior inconsistent statement alone, provided that the state-
ment was made under circumstances supporting its reliability and the defendant
has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant").
50. Commonwealth v. Brady, 507 A.2d 66, 67 (Pa. 1986). For a discussion
of the modern rule, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
51. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970). For a discussion of the
Green decision, see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. For the text of the
Confrontation Clause, see supra note 37.
52. Rule 801(d)(l)(A) states:
(d) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY.
A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) PRIOR STATEMENT BY WITNESS.
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing,
or other proceeding, or in a deposition.
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
53. Id.
54. See Hilliard, Note, supra note 5, at 489 (collecting statutes and cases of
9
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Eleven years after Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court formulated its own ver-
sion of the modem rule in Commonwealth v. Brady.55 In Brady, appellee
Brady was charged with stabbing and killing a plant security guard.
56
Shortly after the stabbing, Brady's girlfriend, Tina Traxler, made a state-
ment to the police in which she said that she was with Brady at the time
of the stabbing and saw Brady murder the security guard. 57 After
Traxler recanted her statement, the trial court permitted the Common-
wealth to introduce the statement as substantive evidence at Brady's
trial. 58 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial
forty-one states that preceded Pennsylvania in adopting modern rule). Many
states, through statutes, had decided to permit prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence prior to the Brady decision. See ALASKA R. EvID.
801 (d)(1)(A) (prior inconsistent statements admissible as substantive evidence at
trial); ARIZ. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); ARK. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(i) (same);
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1235 (same); COLO. R. EVID. 801(d)(l)(A) (same); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 3507(a) (1979) (same); FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.801(2)(a) (same);
HAW. R. EvID. 802.1(1) (same); IDAHO R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1 (Smith-Hurd 1986) (same); IOWA R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(A) (same); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN § 60-460(a) (West Supp. 1984)
(same); ME. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); MINN. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A) (same);
Miss. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); Mo. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same): MONT. R.
EvID. 801(d)(l)(A) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(a)(i) (1985) (same); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.035 (2)(a) (Michie 1986) (same); N.H. R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(A) (same); N.J. R. EvID. 63(1) (same); N.M. R. EvID. 11-801(D)(1)(a)
(same); N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i) (same); OHIO R. EvID. 801(D)(1)(a) (same);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2801(4)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (same); OR. R. EvID.
801(4)(a)(A) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-2(1) (Michie 1987)
(same); TEX. R. EvID. 801(e)(1)(A) (same); UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same);
VT. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); WASH. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(i) (same); W. VA. R.
EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); WIs. R. EVID. 908.01(4)(a)(1) (same); Wyo. R. EVID.
801 (d)(1)(A) (same). Some of the states that have not adopted statutory rules of
evidence have sanctioned the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence through judicial decision. See State v. Whelan, 513 A.2d 86 (Conn.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986) (permitting prior inconsistent statements to be
introduced as substantive evidence); Gibbons v. State, 286 S.E.2d 717 (Ga.
1982) (same); Watkins v. State, 446 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1983) (same); Nugent v.
Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1982) (same); Commonwealth v. Daye,
469 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1984) (same); State v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63 (S.C.),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1982).
55. Brady, 507 A.2d at 67.
56. Id. At trial, the evidence showed that, on September 14, 1990, Brady
and his girlfriend, Tina Traxler, went on an early morning ride. Id. During this
ride, Brady's car became stuck in a ditch and Brady and Traxler began walking
home. Id. On the way home, Traxler and Brady entered the Wilson Manufac-
turing plant. Id. Once inside, a plant security guard caught Brady prying open a
change machine. Id. Brady fought with the guard and eventually stabbed and
killed him. Id.
57. Id. at 70. Ms. Traxler spoke to state and local police on the afternoon
of September 14, 1980. Id. She told the police that she and Brady had entered
the plant and that Brady had scuffled with and stabbed the security guard. Id.
The police tape-recorded Ms. Traxler's statement. Id. A few weeks later, how-
ever, Ms. Traxler recanted her statement. Id.
58. Id. At trial, Traxler continued to adhere to version of the facts she had
[Vol. 38: p. 285
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court's decision, noting that Brady presented the "classic case to illus-
trate why . . . prior statements should be admitted substantively." 59
In reaching its decision, the Brady court discussed at some length
the hallmarks of reliability that persuaded it to sanction the statement's
substantive admissibility. 60 For example, the court noted that Ms.
Traxler made her statement to the police twenty-four hours after the
stabbing, that the statement was tape-recorded and that Ms. Traxler's
attorney and mother were present when she made the statement. 61
However, the court did not adopt any reliability criteria as part of its
holding. Instead, the Brady court held that prior inconsistent statements
of non-party witnesses may be admitted as substantive evidence as long
as "the declarant is a witness at trial and available for cross-
examination.' '62
B. Aftermath of the Brady Decision: The Lower Courts'Application of the
Brady Rule
After the Brady decision, Pennsylvania courts faced the task of ap-
plying the broad rule in Brady to evidentiary issues that arose at trial.
6 3
An analysis of the court decisions following Brady indicates that this task
was a difficult one. While the Brady court devoted considerable atten-
tion to the "reliability" of the prior inconsistent statement at issue, it did
not explicitly adopt reliability criteria as part of its holding. 64 The re-
sulting uncertainty among the courts concerning the status of the relia-
bility portion of the Brady decision led to two distinct interpretations of
Brady.
6 5
given in her recanted statement-she insisted that she and Brady never entered
the warehouse. Id. The Commonwealth was then permitted to "cross-examine"
Ms. Traxler on the basis of her prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 71.
59. Id. at 67. Before Brady reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
Superior Court had reversed Brady's conviction. Id. at 68. The Superior Court
applied the "law in Pennsylvania that prior inconsistent statements of a non-
party witness are not admissible as substantive evidence of the truth of the mat-
ter asserted therein" and determined that the trial court erred in admitting
Traxler's prior inconsistent statement. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Brady,
487 A.2d 891, 892 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
versed the Superior Court's judgment and articulated a new rule for the admis-
sion of prior inconsistent statements. Id. at 67.
60. Id. at 70-71.
61. Id. The Brady court also emphasized that Ms. Traxler was "extensively
questioned by both the prosecutor and defense counsel as to the respective va-
lidity of each statement and as to the discrepancy between them." Id. at 71.
62. Id. at 67.
63. For a discussion of the application of the Brady rule in the lower courts,
see infra 66-84 and accompanying text.
64. Brady, 507 A.2d at 67.
65. Some courts adhered strictly to Brady's holding. For a discussion of
court decisions strictly adhering to the Brady holding, see infra notes 66-78 and
accompanying text. These courts admitted a prior inconsistent statement as
long as the declarant was a witness in court available for cross-examination.
2951993] NOTE
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Some courts adopted a literal approach and simply adhered to
Brady's holding. These courts admitted any prior inconsistent statement
as long as the declarant was available in court and subject to cross-exam-
ination.6 6 When deciding whether to admit a particular prior inconsis-
tent statement into evidence, these courts did not consider the
statement's reliability.
For example, in Plair v. Commonwealth, the parole board permitted
two police officers to testify to the substance of statements allegedly
made by two eyewitnesses to a shooting incident. 6 7 The officers testified
that Francine Donald and her daughter Tamara told the police that
Wade Plair had placed a gun to Tamara Donald's head and had fired two
Other courts adopted a more expansive reading of Brady and interpreted the
Brady rule to require an inquiry into the reliability of the statement. For a dis-
cussion of court decisions adopting a more expansive interpretation of the Brady
rule, see infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. The Brady court, after review-
ing the circumstances in which Ms. Traxler's statement was rendered, stated that
"[u]nder these circumstances, the trial court did not err in allowing [the prior incon-
sistent statement] to be introduced as substantive evidence." Brady, 507 A.2d at
71 (emphasis added). Presumably, this statement led some lower courts to con-
sider the reliability of the circumstances in which a statement was rendered.
66. For example, in Commonwealth v. Mott, the defendant was convicted of
simple assault for knocking down and injuring a bystander while attempting to
flee a supermarket during a shoplifting incident. 539 A.2d 365, 370 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985). At the defendant's preliminary hearing, Mrs. White, the victim, stated
that "she did not know who knocked her down" in the supermarket. Id. How-
ever, at trial, Mrs. White testified that the store manager knocked her down. Id.
On appeal, the defendant asserted that his attorney rendered ineffective assist-
ance of counsel when the attorney failed to object to the admission of Mrs.
White's prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 368. The Superior Court rejected
the defendant's argument. Id. The Superior Court decided that "[t]he Brady
case is in no way limited to the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements that
are recorded." Id. at 369. According to the Mott court, the only relevant question
regarding statement admissibility is whether the declarant is a non-party witness
testifying in a trial and subject to cross-examination. Id. The Mott court noted
that the Brady court had "suggested" that Ms. Traxler's statement was reliable
because the statement was made at a point in time "closer to the event which
took place." Id. (citing Brady, 507 A.2d at 69).
For further examples of cases where evidentiary rulings were based solely
on a strict interpretation of the Brady court's holding, see generally O'Donnell v.
Westinghouse, 528 A.2d 576, 579 (Pa. 1987) (summarily concluding that prior
inconsistent statement is admissible because declarant was witness at trial and
available for cross-examination); Estate of Dankulich v. Tarantino, 532 A.2d
1243, 1245 & n.6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (ruling eyewitness' prior inconsistent
statement was admissible as substantive evidence where witness is available in
court for cross-examination, and disregarding defendant's contention that state-
ment was not reliable); Plair v. Commonwealth, 521 A.2d 989, 990-91 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987) (holding prior inconsistent statement admissible if declarant
is witness in judicial proceeding and available for cross-examination; other fac-
tors irrelevant to admissibility).
67. Plair, 521 A.2d at 990. Parolee Wade Plair was charged with violating
two parole rules-one required parolees to "refrain from owning or possessing
any firearms or other weapons" and another stipulated that parolees must "re-
frain from any assaultive behavior." Id.
296 (Vol. 38: p. 285
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shots at Francine. 68 However, at the parole hearing, the Donalds testi-
fied that they were not able to identify the man who had fired the shots
at them and that Plair did not have a gun.6 9 Nevertheless, the parole
board recommitted Plair.70 On appeal, Plair contended that the hearing
board had erred in admitting the police officers' oral reports of the Don-
ald's prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. 7' But the
Commonwealth court, upon reviewing the hearing, found no error in
the admission of these statements. 7 2 The Commonwealth court did not
interpret Brady as imposing a duty upon a hearing board or trial court to
inquire into a statement's reliability. 73 Instead, the Plair court deter-
mined that "It]he admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement does
not depend on whether it is recorded, oral, or part of a report. These
things may affect the weight of the evidence, but not the
admissibility."
74
Several courts that labored under a strict adherence to Brady's hold-
ing criticized Brady for failing to address the reliability of prior inconsis-
tent statements. For example, in his concurring opinion in
Commonwealth v. Mott, Judge Cirillo criticized the Brady court for discard-
ing a "well-tried rule of jurisprudence."'7 5 Judge Cirillo reasoned that
the Brady court had ignored a concern that many jurisdictions had not-
that hearsay problems arise when unreliable prior inconsistent state-






73. Id. The Plair court quoted Brady in holding that a "prior statement can
be viewed as possessing superior indicia of reliability [because] it was rendered
at a point in time closer to the event described ... when memory will presuma-
bly be fresher and opportunity for fabrication lessened." Id. (quoting Brady, 507
A.2d at 69). Accordingly, the Plair court interpreted Brady as standing for the
proposition that all prior statements are necessarily reliable because they are
rendered closer in time to the event they describe. Id. at 991.
74. Id. at 991.
75. Commonwealth v. Mott, 539 A.2d 365, 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Cir-
illo, J., concurring).
76. Id. (Cirillo, J., concurring). Judge Cirillo was generally concerned
about the reliability of the prior statement. Id. (Cirillo, J., concurring). He was
concerned that "errors can arise in transcription, in misstatement by the officer
preparing the statement for signature, and from leading questions which create
misapprehension on the part of the declarant." Id. (Cirillo, J. concurring). He
also believed that, "[f]requently, witnesses in criminal cases are implicated in the
criminal activity at issue . . ., and the prosecutorial authorities can induce fear, a
sense of guilt, and panic, in such a way as to cause distortion of the facts." Id.
(Cirillo, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Spadafore, 220 S.E.2d 655, 664 (W. Va.
1975)) Judge Cirillo felt the Brady court erred in discarding the orthodox rule.
Id. It is doubtful that Judge Cirillo would have approved of the Brady court's
decision to permit prior inconsistent statements to be used substantively even if
the court had adopted reliability criteria in its decision. However, Judge Cirillo
13
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kin v. Equine Clinics, Inc.,77 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
characterized the Brady decision as an "attempt to follow commentators
who are perhaps less well-experienced in trial advocacy than the justices
of the appellate courts of this Commonwealth," noting that "not even
the Federal Rules of Evidence have taken as liberal a stance" as the
Brady court.
78
Other courts rejected a strict adherence to Brady's holding and de-
termined that the "reliability" portion of the Brady decision was an im-
portant component of the Brady rule. 79 Even among these courts,
however, there was confusion; many differed in their interpretation of
suggests that he might look more favorably upon a rule that required the prior
inconsistent statement to have been rendered under oath. Id. at 370. He noted
that it is the possibility of convicting defendants "upon unsworn testimony" that
makes the modern rule unfair. Id.
77. 546 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). In Durkin, owners of a race horse,
which died minutes after a veterinarian injected the horse with the drug Kymar,
brought action against the veterinarian and the veterinarian's clinic. Id. at 666.
At the trial, the race horse owners sought to introduce a tape-recorded state-
ment of the veterinarian's colleague, Dr. Seeber. Id. at 666-67. In this tape-
recorded statement, Dr. Seeber said that the defendant veterinarian, Dr. DeLeo,
had told him in a phone call that the race horse had died of anaphylactic shock
immediately after Dr. DeLeo had administered Kymar. Id. Dr. Seeber also
stated that he had warned Dr. DeLeo that Kymar could cause anaphylactic shock.
Id. at 667.
The trial court refused to admit Dr. Seeber's statements on "the basis that
those statements were ostensibly based on inadmissible hearsay-Dr. DeLeo's
supposed statements to Dr. Seeber that he did in fact administer Kymar to the
horse." Id. at 562. The race horse owners argued on appeal that Seeber's state-
ments were admissible under the Brady rule. Id. However, the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court rejected the plaintiff's arguments and affirmed the trial court's
decision to exclude Dr. Seeber's statements from evidence. Id. at 668. The
court found that Dr. Seeber's statements were not "otherwise admissible" be-
cause they are "riddled" with double hearsay. Id.
78. Id. at 668. The federal rule that the Durkin court referred to permits the
federal courts to admit prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence
only when the statements are rendered under oath at a formal legal proceeding.
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A). Congress imposed this limitation to preclude the
admission of unreliable statements. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A) and the reasons for the oath limitations Congress imposed on the
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, see infra notes 132-42 and accom-
panying text.
79. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grekis, 601 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (citing Brady, Sopota and Patterson as establishing that prior inconsistent
statements must meet two-pronged Brady test and must be reliable); Common-
wealth v. Sopota, 587 A.2d 805, 809-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (suggesting that
prior inconsistent statement is reliable if declarant takes witness stand at present
trial); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 572 A.2d 1258, 1267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(citing Brady as holding that prior inconsistent statements are admissible "where
circumstances establish their reliability"); Commonwealth v. Troy, 553 A.2d
992, 996 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (asserting that two-prong test set forth in Brady
was that witness be available for cross-examination at judicial proceeding and
that prior statement be "tendered under highly reliable circumstances"); Com-
monwealth v. Harris, 556 A.2d 445, 446 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (recognizing two
requirements of Brady, but further nothing that prior inconsistent statement is
298
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what the "reliability" component required.8 0 For example, in Sopota v.
Commonwealth,8' the Superior Court held that the "reliability" portion of
the Brady decision was satisfied by a declarant's appearance on the wit-
ness stand.8 2  In contrast, the court in Commonwealth v. Mott8 3 consid-
ered the "reliability" component satisfied if the prior out-of-court
statement was made closer in time to the event in question than the de-
clarant's in-court testimony.
84
reliable because given under oath and subject to cross-examination). For a dis-
cussion of the Sopata decision, see infra note 81 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Grekis, 601 A.2d at 1280 (finding prior inconsistent statements
were reliable because made voluntarily); Sopota, 598 A.2d at 809-810 (suggesting
that prior inconsistent statement is reliable if declarant testifies on witness
stand); Patterson, 572 A.2d at 1267 (concluding that declarant's prior inconsis-
tent statements were reliable because statements were made "shortly after the
crime"); Troy, 553 A.2d at 996 (finding prior statement is reliable because mem-
bers of witness' family were present during its rendering and witness appeared
certain of dates and times, despite witness' claim of penicillin-induced confusion
during its rendering); Harris, 556 A.2d at 446 (holding that prior inconsistent
statement is reliable because given under oath and subject to cross-examina-
tion); Commonwealth v. Doa, 553 A.2d 416, 422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (admit-
ting prior inconsistent statement of identification under Brady where witness was
unable to identify defendant in court because statement was made close in time
to event in question).
81. 587 A.2d 805 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). In Sopota, defendant Daniel Sopota
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the Court of Common Pleas of Car-
bon County. Id. He appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in allowing a
declarant's prior inconsistent statement to be introduced into evidence "without
that person first taking the stand and recanting the substance of her earlier state-
ment." Id. at 807.
The trial court had permitted an eyewitness' prior statement to be intro-
duced through the testimony of a police officer, rather than through the testi-
mony of the witness. Id. at 806. The trial court assumed that the components of
Brady, which governed the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments, were satisfied because the witness was "available" for cross-examina-
tion-the eyewitness had been subpoenaed and was sequestered in the hallway
outside the courtroom. Id. at 806.
However, the Superior Court found that the trial court had erred in permit-
ting the Commonwealth to introduce the witness' statement through the police
officer's testimony. Id. at 809. The Superior Court reasoned that the "reliabil-
ity" portion of the Brady decision was not satisfied until the witness was actually
on the witness stand, thereby allowing the jury to observe the witness' de-
meanor. Id. Although the Commonwealth called the witness to the stand after
the police officer testified about the witness' prior inconsistent statement, the
court determined that this "indicia of reliability which makes a prior statement
of a non-party witness admissible for its substantive value must be present when
that statement is presented." Id. at 801. The court determined that the Brady
"dictates" had not been met because it was the police officer who was on the
stand when the witness's prior inconsistent statement was presented and not the
witness. Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a new trial. Id.
82. Id. at 801. The court commented that "the presence of [the witness] on
the witness stand ... provided the indicia of reliability which make her original
statement to the police admissible for its substantive value." Id. at 810.
83. 539 A.2d 365 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
84. Id. at 369. Mott refers to the two-prong test of Brady as the "only"
question that must be addressed in admitting a prior inconsistent statement as
15
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C. The Lively Decision
Given the confusion and criticism generated in the lower courts, the
climate was ripe for a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
that would give some guidance as to the appropriate interpretation of
the Brady rule. In May of 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
presented with the perfect vehicle in which to clarify the Brady rule. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Lively,8 5 imposed limi-
tations on the Brady rule precluding the introduction of unreliable prior
inconsistent statements into evidence.
8 6
The issue in Lively concerned the admissibility of three prior incon-
sistent statements proffered by the Commonwealth.8 7 At trial, the pros-
ecution proffered the prior inconsistent statements of Diane Rucker,
John Moody and Angelo Williamson.8 8 Each statement supported the
prosecution's theory that Kevin Lively had murdered Tyrone Miller be-
cause Miller had vandalized Lively's automobile. First, the prosecution
introduced Diane Rucker's statement through the testimony of a Phila-
delphia police officer.8 9 In her trial testimony, Diane Rucker said she
never told the police officer that she saw Lively shoot Tyrone Miller.
90
Nevertheless, the police officer testified, over the appellant's objection,
to the substance of Ms. Rucker's alleged conversation with him on the
day of the killing.9 1 The officer testified that Diane Rucker told him that
she had seen Lively shoot Tyrone Miller.
92
Second, the Commonwealth introduced the prior inconsistent state-
ment ofJohn Moody.9 3 In his trial testimony, Moody said he did not see
Lively during the first shooting incident. 9 4 The Commonwealth then
cross-examined Mr. Moody using a memorandum prepared by a police
detective. 95 According to the memorandum, Moody allegedly told the
substantive evidence. Id. The Mott court added, however, that although the
Brady decision does not require a separate reliability component, such a compo-
nent would be satisfied by the fact that the prior statement was rendered closer
in time to the event in question than the witness' trial testimony. Id.
85. 610 A.2d 7 (Pa. 1992).
86. For a discussion of the Brady court's holding, see supra notes 55-62 and
accompanying text.
87. Lively, 610 A.2d at 9.
88. Id. at 10.
89. Id. Ms. Rucker allegedly made her prior inconsistent statement during
a telephone conversation with Officer Fleming. Id. Ms. Rucker denied having
had such a conversation with the officer. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 10. Officer Fleming also testified that Diane Rucker gave him a
description of Lively and Lively's car and told him where Lively lived. Id. at 11.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id. John Moody also denied making such a statement to Detective
Rocks and Assistant District Attorney Rosen. Id. Moody allegedly made the
statement during an interview with them on November 20, 1986. Id.
95. Id. Detective Rocks prepared the memorandum at the direction of As-
300 [Vol. 38: p. 285
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Philadelphia police that, following the first shooting incident, Lively had
"told Moody that he had shot at a guy who had broken his car window
and [that] the next time he would kill Tyrone Miller."
'9 6
Finally, the Commonwealth introduced Angelo Williamson's prior
inconsistent statements.9 7 In these statements Williamson described
what he had seen on the day Tyrone Miller was killed. 98 At trial, Mr.
Williamson admitted that he had made statements to the police and that
he had testified at a preliminary hearing about Tyrone Miller's mur-
der.99 However, Williamson claimed that his prior statement and testi-
mony "were untrue because they had been coerced by the
Commonwealth."' 10 0 The Commonwealth used these statements in its
cross-examination of Mr. Williamson.'
0 '
On appeal, Lively asserted that the trial court improperly extended
the holding of the Brady decision by permitting the Commonwealth to
introduce Ms. Rucker, Mr. Moody and Mr. Williamson's prior inconsis-
tent statements.' 0 2 Specifically, Lively contended that the witnesses' al-
sistant District Attorney Rosen, following an interview with John Moody. Id.
Kevin Lively objected to the cross-examination of John Moody regarding
Moody's alleged prior inconsistent statements. Id.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Id. at 10. These statements were "given under oath at a formal legal





102. Id. at 9. Appellant Lively raised various issues on appeal, two of which
were addressed by the court. First, Lively contended that his retrial was a viola-
tion of the double jeopardy protections afforded him by the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id. at 8. Generally, the double jeopardy bar forbids
reprosecution for the same crime. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Kunish, 602
A.2d 849 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Traitz, 597 A.2d 1129 (Pa. 1991)).
Where the defendant obtains a mistrial through his or her own motion, however,
the double jeopardy bar will not prevent retrial unless the defendant can show
that the prosecutor intentionally provoked the motion for mistrial. Id. at 8-9.
(citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U.S. 667 (1982); Commonwealth v. Simons, 522 A.2d 537 (1987)). In Lively, the
appellant alleged that the prosecutor intentionally referred to him as a "mur-
derer" while questioning witness Diane Rucker in an effort to force mistrial. Id.
at 8. Appellant Lively alleged that "the prosecutor was frustrated by his wit-
ness's change of story and was not prepared to seek admission of the testimony
under Brady." Id. at 8. The trial court granted appellant Lively's motion for a
mistrial based on the prosecutor's characterization of Lively as a "murderer,"
but decided that the prosecutor's conduct was unintentional. Id. at 8-9. Thus,
the trial court denied Lively's subsequent motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds. Id. at 8. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, conclud-
ing that Lively's double jeopardy claim was without merit. Id. at 9.
Appellant Lively's second ground for appeal was that the prior inconsistent
statements of Diane Rucker, John Moody and Angelo Williamson did not satisfy
the "reliability" requirements of Brady. For a discussion of the court's treatment
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leged statements did not possess "the hallmarks of reliability" that
distinguished Tina Traxler's tape-recorded statement in Brady.' 0 3
Therefore, Lively argued, the admission of these "unrecorded non-ver-
batim" statements as substantive evidence constituted prejudicial er-
ror. 10 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed.
10 5
The Lively court began by examining the Superior Court's rationale
in affirming Lively's conviction and life sentence.' 0 6 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court's interpretation of
the Brady rule was flawed. 10 7 The Supreme Court found that the Supe-
rior Court incorrectly reasoned that Brady did not require prior inconsis-
tent statements to be either recorded or verbatim to be admissible.10 8
The Superior Court had misinterpreted a vital component of the Brady
decision by failing to recognize that reliability is a necessary precursor to
the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements under the Brady
rule.' 0 9 While the Lively court conceded that the Brady holding did not
specifically refer to the need to ensure statement reliability, the Lively
court pointed out that the Brady court had emphasized, and treated as
persuasive, the highly reliable circumstances under which Ms. Traxler
had rendered her prior inconsistent statement.I 10 Reliability, the Lively
Appellant Lively raised two additional issues on appeal. Lively, 610 A.2d at
10. However, the Lively court never reached these issues because it determined
that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting Diane Rucker and
John Moody's statements as substantive evidence. Id. at 11. First, Lively argued
that the prosecution's entire case against him rested on prior inconsistent state-
ments admitted as substantive evidence. Id. at 11 n.2. The contradictory nature
of this evidence, Lively argued, demanded "an arrest of judgement for insuffi-
ciency" or a new trial. Id. Second, Lively raised an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. Id. Lively claimed his attorney failed to cross-examine a police
witness about supposed eyewitness testimony, called a police officer to the stand
to testify "for no rational purpose" and purposely elicited prejudicial hearsay
about Lively during cross-examination of a witness. Id.
103. Id. at 9; see also Brady, 507 A.2d at 71. For a discussion of the charac-
teristics of Tina Traxler's statement in Brady, which contributed to the state-
ment's reliability, see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
104. Lively, 610 A.2d at 10.
105. Id. at 10-11.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 10.
108. Id. The Brady court had held that prior inconsistent statements of
non-party declarants are admissible "where the declarant is a witness at trial and
available for cross-examination." Brady, 507 A.2d at 67. For a discussion of the
Brady decision, see supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
109. Lively, 610 A.2d at 10. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized
that "the important components of the Brady rule are that otherwise admissible
prior inconsistent statements be given under highly reliable circumstances and the
non-party declarant be subject to cross-examination in the proceeding where the
prior statement is to be admitted." Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 9. For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding Ms.
Traxler's statement that the Brady and Lively courts considered "highly reliable
and trustworthy," see supra note 60-61 and accompanying text.
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court stressed, was a vital component of the Brady rule."I Finally, the
Lively court determined that "to ensure that only those hearsay declara-
tions that are demonstrably reliable and trustworthy are considered as
substantive evidence," a prior inconsistent statement must meet one of
the following conditions to be admissible as substantive evidence at trial:
(1) the statement must have been given under oath at a formal legal
proceeding; (2) the statement must have been reduced to a signed writ-
ing adopted by the declarant; or (3) the statement must have been re-
corded contemporaneously with its rendering." 12
Applying this new admissibility test in assessing the reliability of the
prior inconsistent statements of the three Commonwealth witnesses in
Lively, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that two of the state-
ments, those of Diane Rucker and John Moody, were not rendered
under "highly reliable" circumstances.1 13 Accordingly, the Lively court
decided that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting Di-
ane Rucker and John Moody's prior inconsistent statements as substan-
tive evidence. 14 Neither Ms. Rucker's nor Mr. Moody's statements
satisfied any of the reliability criteria for admissibility.' 15 In contrast,
the court held that Angelo Williamson's prior inconsistent statements
were properly introduced.1 6 Mr. Williamson's statements satisfied the
reliability criteria because Mr. Williamson had rendered the statements
under oath at a formal legal proceeding and had signed and adopted the
statements. 17 Based on these findings, the Lively court reversed the Su-
111. Lively, 610 A.2d at 10.
112. Id. at 10. To support its holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
cited Hilliard, Note, supra note 5. In her article, Ms. Hilliard suggested that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should limit the broad rule adopted in Brady "so as
to admit only those statements which bear sufficient indicia of reliability" and
thereby reduce "the chances of abuse through fabrication and even misinterpre-
tation of such statements." Id. at 503. Hilliard asserted that oral prior inconsis-
tent statements pose a danger of "inaccuracy." Id. at 501. She recommended
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopt the same limitations on the substan-
tive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements that Hawaii has adopted. Id.
For the text of Hawaii's rule of evidence governing substantive admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements, see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
113. Lively, 610 A.2d at 10.
114. Id.
115. Id. The Lively court noted that "Ms. Rucker's alleged prior inconsis-
tent statements were not given under oath at a formal proceeding ... [nor] had
such statements been reduced to a signed writing or recorded verbatim contem-
poraneously with the making of the statements." Id. at 11. In addition, after
reviewing the admissibility of John Moody's prior inconsistent statement, the
court concluded that "[a]lthough Mr. Moody's alleged prior statements were re-
duced to a writing, it was not signed or adopted by him." Id. Furthermore, the
court noted that because the memorandum was not prepared until after the
detective's interview with Mr. Moody, it could not be considered "a contempora-
neous verbatim recording of Mr. Moody's statements." Id.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Id.
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perior Court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial."t 8
D. The Law After Lively
On the same day as the Lively decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court applied the Brady rule and the newly formulated Lively rule in Com-
monwealth v. Burgos."19 In Burgos, appellant Jerry Burgos was convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to death for the strangulation
death of his pregnant wife, Nilsa Burgos. 120 Although Burgos cited nu-
merous errors on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on
the trial court's admission of two prior inconsistent statements made by
the Burgos' six-year-old son, Jerry Michael Burgos.
12 1
At his father's trial, Jerry Michael Burgos testified for the Common-
wealth about a fire that occurred on the night of his mother's death. 12 2
At the conclusion of Jerry Michael's testimony, the Commonwealth in-
troduced two prior inconsistent statements he had allegedly made dur-
ing interviews with the police.1 23 The police had not recorded either of
Jerry Michael Burgos' two prior statements contemporaneously and
Jerry Michael did not give either of the statements under oath.' 2 4 Fur-
thermore, the prosecution introduced Jerry Michael's prior inconsistent
statements through the testimony of a police officer rather than through
cross-examination of Jerry Michael. 125 The Burgos court held that the
introduction of the boy's prior inconsistent statements as substantive ev-
idence constituted prejudicial error because the statements failed to sat-
isfy the Lively admissibility criteria and that their use at trial violated the
118. Id.
119. 610 A.2d 11 (Pa. 1992).
120. Id. at 12-13. In addition to murder, Burgos was convicted of two
counts of arson, endangering property and corpse abuse. Id. at 11. Burgos re-
ported a fire at his home in the early morning hours of May 31, 1988. Id. at 13.
Neighbors called the fire department. Id. When the firefighters arrived at the
Burgos home, they saw Burgos throwing rocks through the house's front win-
dows. Id. This fed the fire. Id. After the firefighters put the fire out, they found
Nilsa Burgos' charred remains in the back bedroom of the house. Id. Later, an
autopsy revealed that Mrs. Burgos "had been manually strangled to death prior
to the time of the fire." Id. Forensic scientists also discovered a gasoline-like
substance on the victim's flesh. Id. at 14.
121. Id. After reviewing the facts of the case, the Burgos court concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to support Burgos' conviction. Id. However,
because Jerry Michael Burgos' prior inconsistent statements had been intro-
duced as substantive evidence at trial in contravention of the Brady and Lively
admissibility criteria, the court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 14-15.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id. According to the court, "no interested adult" was present on the
behalf of the child at either interview. Id.
124. Id. In fact, Trooper Ritter testified that the police altered Jerry
Michael Burgos' statements after they interviewed him in order to register a
"more intelligent form." Id.
125. Id. at 14-15.
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"purpose" of Brady. 12 6
126. Id. The court's reference to the "purpose" of Brady no doubt refers to
Brady's objective of permitting the introduction of prior inconsistent statements
as substantive evidence only where the "usual dangers of hearsay are largely
nonexistent." Brady, 507 A.2d at 69 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155 (1970)). The "usual dangers of hearsay" are threefold: (1) the declarant's
prior inconsistent statement was not made under oath;. (2) the fact-finder was
unable to observe declarant's demeanor at the time the statement was made; and
(3) the declarant was not subject to contemporaneous cross-examination before
the fact-finder. Graham, supra note 27, at 1568. Jerry Michael Burgos' prior
inconsistent statements implicated all three of these "hearsay dangers." When
Jerry made his out-of-court statements he was not under oath, he was not sub-
ject to contemporaneous cross-examination and the fact-finder was not able to
observe his demeanor. Burgos, 610 A.2d at 14. Normally, the prosecution fulfills
these requirements in the courtroom by cross-examining the declarant. Such
cross-examination "defuses hearsay concerns and provides the fact-finder with
ample opportunity to determine the truth." Brady, 507 A.2d at 69 (citing Com-
monwealth v. Thirkield, 467 A.2d 323, 324 (Pa. 1983)) (McDermott, J., dissent-
ing). However, the "hearsay concerns" regarding Jerry Michael Burgos'
statements were never "defused" because the prosecution never cross-examined
Jerry Michael about these statements. Burgos, 610 A.2d at 14. Instead, the pros-
ecution introduced Jerry Michael's prior inconsistent statements through the di-
rect testimony of two police officers. Id.
In light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision in Lively, its
rationale in remanding Burgos is most intriguing. First, the Burgos court pointed
out that Jerry Michael Burgos' two prior inconsistent statements were not
"otherwise admissible" because they were "not given under highly reliable cir-
cumstances." Burgos, 610 A.2d at 14. The Burgos court cited the newly-an-
nounced Lively admissibility criteria in defining the scope of "reliability"
required for the substantive admissibility of a prior statement. Id. at 14; see
Lively, 610 A.2d at 10 (discussing admissibility criteria). For a discussion of the
Lively court's admissibility criteria, see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
However, the Burgos court stressed two additional points of error regarding the
admission ofJerry Michael Burgos' prior inconsistent statements at trial. Burgos,
610 A.2d at 14-15.
First, the court expressed concern about the circumstances under which
Jerry Michael Burgos made the statements. Id. at 14. The court noted thatJerry
Michael Burgos' original statement "was obtained in the presence of two police
officers and two representatives of the Commonwealth with no interested adult
present on behalf of the child." Id. This is not the first time the court has made
an inquiry into the events surrounding the rendering of a declarant's out-of-
court statement. For instance, in Brady the court discussed, at some length, the
atmosphere in which Ms. Traxler gave her prior inconsistent statement,
stressing that the circumstances indicated that Ms. Traxler made her statement
"knowingly, voluntarily and with [full] understanding of her rights and options."
Lively, 610 A.2d at 10. For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the
rendering of Tina Traxler's statement, see supra notes 60-61 and accompanying
text. In contrast, however, the Lively court neither expressed concern nor in-
quired into the coercive circumstances Angelo Williamson claimed existed at the
time he made his prior inconsistent statement. Lively, 610 A.2d at 10. Rather,
the Lively court summarily concluded that Angelo Williamson's statement was
properly admitted because it was contemporaneously recorded and given under
oath. Id. at 11.
The second point of error the Burgos court emphasized was that the prose-
cution did not introduce Jerry Michael Burgos' prior inconsistent statements
during the child's cross-examination. Burgos, 610 A.2d at 14. The court rea-
soned that by introducing Jerry Michael's two prior inconsistent statements
21
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IV. METHODS FOR ENSURING STATEMENT RELIABILITY
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Although Pennsylvania has only recently adopted specific limita-
tions on the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements,
the federal courts and twenty-seven states have been limiting the admis-
sibility of such statements due to reliability concerns for a number of
years. ' 2 7 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (A) limits the
introduction of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence to
statements made under oath.' 28 Twenty-two states have adopted the
federal rule essentially verbatim.129 Five states, including Pennsylvania,
have adopted a less restrictive approach. These states impose various
restrictions on the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, but
permit the introduction of statements not made under oath if the state-
ments possess sufficient indicia of reliability. 130 The standards Penn-
sylvania adopted in Lively are identical to the standards presently
employed in Hawaii. 131
A. Federal Approach to Ensuring Reliability of Prior Inconsistent Statements
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) (A) governs the admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements of non-party witnesses in the federal
through the testimony of Trooper Ritter instead of through cross-examination
of Jerry Michael, the jury "was impermissibly deprived of the opportunity to
observe the child's demeanor and hear his testimony and explanations regarding
the discrepancy." Id. The Burgos court's concern that prior inconsistent state-
ments be subject to rigorous cross-examination is not unusual, given that the
Lively court cited the availability of a witness for cross-examination as an "impor-
tant component" of the Brady rule. Lively, 610 A.2d at 9-10. Nonetheless, like
Jerry Michael Burgos' prior inconsistent statement in Burgos, Diane Rucker's
statement in Lively was introduced through the testimony of a police officer.
Lively, 610 A.2d at 10. However, the Lively court determined that the trial court
improperly admitted Diane Rucker's statement because the statement was not
made under oath or recorded, and not because the statement was not intro-
duced through the cross-examination of Diane Rucker. Id at 11.
127. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), which governs
the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in the federal
courts, see supra note 52. For a list of states that follow the federal rule and limit
admissibility to statements that have been rendered under oath, see infra note
144. For further discussion of the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements in other states, see Hilliard, Note, supra note 5, at 489-96.
128. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
129. For a listing of the states that have adopted the federal rule verbatim,
see infra note 144.
130. The five states adopting such an approach are Pennsylvania, Hawaii,
Connecticut, Illinois and New Jersey. For the limitations imposed by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Lively, see supra note 112 and accom-
panying text. For the text of the evidence rules in Hawaii, Illinois, Connecticut
and New Jersey, see infra notes 147-50.
131. For the governing rule of evidence in Hawaii, see infra note 147.
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courts. 13 2 Rule 801 (d) (1) (A) provides that prior inconsistent statements
are admissible as substantive evidence only if the statements were given
under oath at a prior trial, hearing or other legal proceeding.'
3 3
The present formulation of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is the product of a
compromise between the House and Senate.' 3 4 Both houses of Con-
gress fiercely debated the wisdom of imposing limitations on the admis-
sibility of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.' 3 5 The
Advisory Committee drafted the original version of the rule. 13 6 This
version, which the Senate had advocated, permitted all prior inconsis-
tent statements to be introduced as substantive evidence at trial.'
3 7
However, the House was extremely dissatisfied with this version of the
rule because of concerns about the reliability of prior inconsistent state-
ments. 13 8 Therefore, the House Judiciary Committee recommended in-
cluding an oath requirement.' 3 9 Congress ultimately incorporated this
recommendation into the final version of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to exclude
unreliable statements.
4 0
132. For the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (A), see supra
note 52.
133. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A).
134. Graham, supra note 27, at 1575.
135. Id.
136. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 293 (1972). The rule drafted by the Advisory Committee and submitted by
the Supreme Court provided in pertinent part:
(d) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY. A statement is not hearsay if
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his
testimony....
Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. at 293. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary sup-
ported this original version of the rule. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1974).
137. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 293 (1972).
138. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973). The current
rule expressly permits the use of statements given under oath at a prior trial,
hearing or deposition. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A). However, the Rule also al-
lows courts to admit statements made under oath at "other proceeding[s]." Id.
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this provision to permit the use of testimony
given before a grand jury, even though such testimony may not have been sub-
ject to cross-examination. See United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055,
1057 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989). Roger Park, in an article
addressing hearsay issues, suggests that courts permitting the substantive use of
grand jury testimony that has not been subject to cross-examination and exclud-
ing statements rendered in an informal setting, do so because "witness testi-
mony in a grand jury proceeding is likely to be accurately recorded and will not
be fabricated by the in-court witness." Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach To
Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 80 (1987).
139. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973).
140. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), see supra note
1993] 307NOTE
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In formulating Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Congress was predominantly
concerned with developing criteria that would ensure that a prior incon-
sistent statement was not fabricated and that "subtle influence, coer-
cion, or deception ha[d] not impaired its reliability."'14 1 In deciding to
establish an evidentiary rule that distinguished between reliable and un-
reliable statements, Congress implicitly rejected the alternate solution
of permitting the introduction of all statements and allowing the trier of
fact to evaluate reliability. '
4 2
B. State Court Approaches to Ensuring Reliability of
Prior Inconsistent Statements
Although many scholars have criticized Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A) as being overly restrictive and excluding many statements
that possess indicia of reliability, 14 3 twenty-two states have adopted the
Rule essentially verbatim. 14 4 Eleven states have adopted the Senate's
version of the Rule and authorize their courts to admit prior inconsis-
tent statements as substantive evidence as long as the witness appears at
141. Graham, supra note 27, at 1582.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., id. at 1566 ("[R]ule 801 (d)(1)(A) as enacted denies substan-
tive admissibility to some prior inconsistent statements for which there are
strong guarantees of reliability"); Abraham P. Ordover, Surprise! That Damaging
Turncoat Witness Is Still With Us: An Analysis Of Federal Rules Of Evidence 607,
801(d)(1)(A) And 403, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 74 (1976) (noting that "there is an
abundance of cases in which there may be greater reliability in the unsworn
rather than the sworn statement"); Stalmack, supra note 26, at 251 (criticizing
restrictions in Rule 801(d)(l)(A) as "compromising step backward" from the
Senate's less restrictive proposal).
144. ARK. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(i) (requiring prior statement be given under
oath only if offered in criminal proceeding); FLA. EvID. CODE 90.801 (2)(a) (prior
inconsistent statement admissible if given under oath at formal legal proceed-
ing); IDAHO R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); KENT. R. EVID. 422A.0801A. (1)(A)
(KRE 801-A) (same); ME. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); MIcH. R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(A); MINN. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A) (same); Mo. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A)
(same); Miss. R. EviD. 801(d)(l)(A) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(a)(i)
(1989) (same); N.H. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); N.D. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i)
(requiring prior statement be given under oath only if offered in criminal pro-
ceeding); OHIO R. EVID. 801(D)(l)(a) (providing, in addition to oath require-
ment, that statement must be "subject to cross-examination by the party against
whom the statement is offered" at trial, hearing or other proceeding); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. 12 § 2801 4(a)(1) (prior inconsistent statement admissible if given
under oath at formal legal proceeding); ORE. EvID. Code 801(4)(a)(A) (same);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-16-2.(1) (Rule 801(d)(1)) (1987) (same); TEX. R.
EvID. 801(e)(l)(A) (excluding use of grand jury testimony in criminal trials);
WYoM. R. EvID. 801 (d)(l)(A) (requiring witness give statement under oath only
if offered at criminal proceeding); W. VA. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) (A) (prior inconsis-
tent statement admissible if given under oath at formal legal proceeding); WASH.
R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(i) (same); VT. R. EvID. 801 (d)(1)(A) (same); see also Hooper v.
States, 585 So. 2d 137, 140 (Ala. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2857 (1991) (com-
menting that "the federal rule [801(d)(1)(A)] is a good rule, that it does not
substantially prejudice the rights of a defendant to a fair trial, and that it fosters
a search for the truth").
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trial and is available for cross-examination.' 45 Five states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia currently preclude the substantive use of these state-
ments and follow the orthodox rule, which permits courts to admit prior
inconsistent statements solely for impeachment purposes.
14 6
In developing criteria that define the circumstances in which prior
inconsistent statements may be introduced as substantive evidence, five
states have taken a middle ground. These states neither strictly prohibit
the substantive use of prior inconsistent statement nor permit all state-
ments to be admitted substantively. In addition to Pennsylvania,
Hawaii, 14 7 New Jersey, 148 Illinois' 4 9 and Connecticut' 50 each require
145. See ALASKA R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (prior inconsistent statement admis-
sible if witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination); ARIZ. R.
EvID. 801(d)(l)(A) (same); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1235 (same); COLO. R. EvID.
801(d)(1)(A) (same); DEL. UNIFORM R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same); MONT. R.
EVID. 801(d)(l)(A) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.0352.(a) (Michie 1986)
(same); N. M. R. EVID. 11-801 D(l)(a) (same); R.I. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (same);
Wis. R. EvID. 908.01(4)(a)(1) (same); UTAH R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A) (Michie 1992)
(same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (a) (same).
146. N.Y. R. EvID. § 60.35 (restricting use of prior inconsistent statements
to impeachment purposes); State v. Taylor, 593 So. 2d 431, 432 (La. Ct. App.
1992) ("[elvidence of a prior inconsistent statement ... is admissible solely to
attack the credibility of a witness"); Outlaw v. United States, 604 A.2d 873, 880
(D.C. 1992) ("a prior inconsistent statement goes only to the issue of credibility
and cannot be viewed as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt"); State v.
Miller, 408 S.E.2d 846, 850 (N.C. 1991) (when "party calling a witness is genu-
inely surprised by the witness' change of his or her version of facts, impeach-
ment by prior inconsistent statements is proper ... [but such statements] may
not be admitted as substantive evidence"); State v. Duke, 1991 WL 270210 at *
2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (hostile witnesses may be questioned about prior
inconsistent statements for purpose of testing credibility of witness, but not as
substantive evidence); Bruce v. State, 569 A.2d 1254 (Md. 1990) (holding that
party may request limiting instruction that prior inconsistent statements are ad-
missible only to impeach witnesses' testimony); Hall v. Commonwealth, 355
S.E.2d 591, 595 (Va. 1987) (prior inconsistent statements "are to be considered
only insofar as they may affect the credibility of the witness, and may not be
considered as proof of the truth of their content"). For a discussion of the "or-
thodox rule," see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
147. Hawaii Rule of Evidence 802.1(1) provides:
HEARSAY EXCEPTION; PRIOR STATEMENTS BY WITNESSES.
The following statements previously made by witnesses who testify at the
trial or hearing are not excluded by the hearsay rule:
(1) Inconsistent Statement. The declarant is subject to cross-examination
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement, the
statement is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, the statement
is offered in compliance with rule 613(b) [governing use of prior
inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes], and the
statement was:
(A) Given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition; or
(B) Reduced to writing and signed or otherwise adopted or approved
by the declarant; or
(C) Recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic,
mechanical, electrical, or other means contemporaneously with
the making of the statement[.]
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additional assurances of reliability beyond the availability of the witness
HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1). The commentary to Hawaii Rule of Evidence 802.1
states that Hawaii adopted these reliability safeguards to parallel a provision of
the Jencks Act. Id.
The Jencks Act, which governs the discovery of statements made by wit-
nesses to federal agents, provides in pertinent part:
(e) The term "statement," . in relation to any witness called by the
United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or other-
wise adopted or approved by him; [or]
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of
an oral statement made by said witness and recorded contem-
poraneously with the making of such oral statement[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(l)-(2) (1982).
The objective of these particular provisions of the Jencks Act is to ensure
the reliability and trustworthiness of a witness' statement. Hilliard, Note, supra
note 5, at 495 n. 108 (citing Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959)).
148. Subsection (a) of NewJersey Rule of Evidence 63(1) provides, in perti-
nent part:
A statement is admissible if previously made by a person who is a wit-
ness at a hearing, provided it would have been admissible if made by
him while testifying and the statement:
(a) Is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in
compliance with the requirements of Rule 22(a) and (b) [governing
use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes];
however, when the statement is offered by the party calling the wit-
ness it shall be admissible only if, in addition to the foregoing re-
quirements, it
(i) is contained in a sound recording or in a writing made or
signed by the witness in circumstances establishing its reliability
or
(ii) was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial
or other judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, administrative or
grand jury proceeding, or in deposition.
N.J. R. EvID. 63(1).
149. The Illinois rule governing the admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements reads, in pertinent part:
In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or
trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the state-
ment; and
(c) the statement-
(1) ... [is] made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceed-
ing, or
(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which
the witness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by
the witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the taking of the
statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in
which the admission into evidence of the prior statement is
being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately recorded
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at trial before admitting prior inconsistent statements as substantive evi-
dence.
The rule governing substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements in Hawaii is virtually identical to the rule adopted in Lively:
Hawaii requires that a prior statement be given under oath, reduced to
a signed writing, or be recorded contemporaneously with its rendering
before the statement can be introduced as substantive evidence.' 5' Illi-
nois and Connecticut also have rules similar to the rule adopted in
Lively, except that Illinois and Connecticut impose an additional limita-
tion-the statement must narrate or describe an event about which the
declarant has personal knowledge.152
Among the five states comprising the middle ground, New Jersey
has the most restrictive rule. 15 3 Concerned with reliability, the New
Jersey courts have imposed a two-step process for evaluating the relia-
bility of prior inconsistent statements.154 First, the judge must conduct
a pretrial evidentiary hearing to assess the reliability of the statement.' 5 5
Second, the declarant must be subject to in-court cross-examination
concerning the statements. 15 6 During the pretrial evidentiary hearing
the judge evaluates the reliability of the statement according to a list of
fifteen factors. 15 7 The list includes such factors as the existence of cor-
by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any other simi-
lar electronic means of sound recording.
ILL. REV. STAT. 725 § 115-10.1 (1989).
150. Connecticut has formulated its rule regarding the substantive admissi-
bility of prior inconsistent statements through judicial decision. State v. Whe-
lan, 513 A.2d 86, 92 (Conn.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). Connecticut
permits the use of written prior inconsistent statements if the statement is
"signed by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated, when
the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross examination." Id. Connecti-
cut courts have interpreted this rule to permit substantive admissibility of tape
recorded statements. See State v. Alvarez, 579 A.2d 515, 522 (1990) (holding
tape-recorded statements admissible as substantive evidence at trial).
151. For the text of the Hawaii rule of evidence governing admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements, see supra note 147. For the text of Pennsylvania's
rule as adopted in Lively, see text accompanying supra note 112.
152. For the rules governing the substantive admissibility of prior inconsis-
tent statements in Connecticut and Illinois, see supra notes 149-50.
153. For the text of New Jersey's rule, see supra note 148.
154. See State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107, 1115 (N.J. 1991) (setting forth
requirements for substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. The NewJersey courts evaluate the following factors in assessing
the reliability of prior inconsistent statements:
(1) the declarant's connection to and interest in the matter reported in
the out-of-court statement, (2) the person or persons to whom the
statement was given, (3) the place and occasion of giving the statement,
(4) whether the declarant was then in custody or otherwise a target of
the investigation, (5) the physical and mental condition of the declarant
at the time, (6) the presence or absence of other persons, (7) whether
the declarant incriminated himself or sought to exculpate himself by his
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roborating evidence and the physical and mental condition of the de-
clarant when the statement was made.'
5 8
V. ANALYSIS
In Commonwealth v. Lively, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court imposed
limitations on the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments to "ensure that only those hearsay declarations that are demon-
strably reliable and trustworthy are considered as substantive
evidence." 159 The Lively court's new criteria for the substantive admissi-
bility of prior inconsistent statements will undoubtedly exclude many of
the unreliable prior inconsistent statements that were admissible under
the Brady rule. However, the Lively court stopped short of its goal of
ensuring that only trustworthy statements are admissible at trial by fail-
ing to provide sufficient guidance to the lower courts in evaluating state-
ment reliability and failing to adopt a personal knowledge requirement.
Under the Lively rule, prior inconsistent statements are admissible if
the declarant is available in court for cross-examination and the prior
statement is rendered under oath, reduced to a signed writing, or re-
corded contemporaneously with its making.' 6 0 Therefore, under the
Lively rule only substantiated, verifiable statements may be introduced as
substantive evidence at trial.'16 Thus, statements meeting the Lively cri-
teria are necessarily more reliable than the unsubstantiated statements
that were admissible under Brady. Under the Brady rule Pennsylvania
courts were permitted to admit any prior inconsistent statement as sub-
stantive evidence as long as the declarant testified in court and was avail-
able for cross-examination.'
6 2
For example, under the Brady rule, oral prior inconsistent state-
statement, (8) the extent to which the writing is in the declarant's hand,
(9) the presence or absence, and the nature of, any interrogation,
(10) whether the offered sound recording or writing contains the en-
tirety, or only a portion [or a] summary, of the communication,
(11) the presence or absence of any motive to fabricate, (12) the pres-
ence or absence of any express or implicit pressures, inducement or
coercion for making the statement, (13) whether the anticipated use of
the statement was apparent or made known to the declarant, (14) the
inherent believability of the statement, and (15) the presence or ab-
sence of corroborating evidence.
Id.
158. Id.
159. Commonwealth v. Lively, 610 A.2d 7, 10 (Pa. 1992). For a discussion
of the limitations the Lively court imposed on the substantive admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements, see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
160. Lively, 610 A.2d at 10. For a discussion of the exact holding in Lively,
see text accompanying supra note 112.
161. For example, statements given under oath will be supported by a tran-
script of the legal proceeding. Likewise, a tape cassette or a written statement
will provide verifiable evidence of the witness' tape-recorded or signed and
adopted statements.
162. Commonwealth v. Brady, 509 A.2d 66, 67 (Pa. 1986).
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ments that were not supported by extrinsic evidence could be intro-
duced as substantive evidence at trial.' 63 Yet, commentators have noted
that oral statements are the type of prior statement "most likely not to
have been made and most likely, if made, to have been unfairly obtained
or inaccurately reported. '164 Permitting the substantive use of oral
prior inconsistent statements "increases the temptation and opportunity
for fabrication and distortion by witnesses called to report [them]."'
1 65
By requiring a prior inconsistent statement to be recorded, reduced to a
signed writing, or given under oath at a legal proceeding, where a rec-
ord of the proceeding is likely to have been maintained, the Lively court
has wisely excluded statements that depend on the testimony of third
parties for their sole proof and content.
In addition to the risk that an unsubstantiated oral statement may
have been inaccurately reported or fabricated, there is also a risk that an
oral statement may contain an exaggerated or distorted version of the
truth. 16 6 The Lively rule illustrates, however, that this risk may be allevi-
ated. A declarant who makes his or her statement under oath, or signs a
written copy of his or her statement, or is told that his or her statement
is being recorded, should be suitably impressed with the seriousness of
the occasion and deterred from rendering an exaggerated statement
that he or she could be required to explain later.
Furthermore, the Lively decision provides an invaluable "checklist"
to the lower courts for evaluating the reliability of prior inconsistent
statements. 16 7 After Brady, the Pennsylvania lower courts reached in-
consistent decisions regarding the status of the "reliability" portion of
the Brady decision. 16 8 The Lively decision should clear up this area of
confusion. The decision emphasized that the reliability of a prior incon-
sistent statement is a vital component to the Brady admissibility rule and
provided a list of the types of prior inconsistent statements that courts
163. Id. at 67. The Brady court did not adopt any reliability criteria as part
of its holding. Id. Instead, the Brady court held that any prior inconsistent state-
ment was admissible as substantive evidence as long as the declarant was avail-
able in court for cross-examination. Id. For a further discussion of the Brady
decision, see supra notes 50-84 and accompanying text.
164. Graham, supra note 27, at 1588; McCormick, Turncoat Witness, supra
note 1, at 588.
165. State v. Whelan, 513 A.2d 86, 92 (Conn.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994
(1986).
166. See Whelan, 513 A.2d at 92. The Connecticut Supreme Court has rea-
soned that admitting unsubstantiated oral statements presents the risk that the
statements a witness may have "made in jest or [made] to boast of knowledge of
criminal activity in which the declarant was not actually involved" could be con-
sidered as substantive evidence by the fact-finder. Id. at 92. These statements
would be "inordinately difficult for the declarant to explain and might be critical
in convincing the trier of the defendant's guilt." Id.
167. For the exact language of the Lively rule, see text accompanying supra
note 112.
168. For a discussion of the varying interpretations of the Brady court's
holding, see supra notes 66-84 and accompanying text.
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may admit at trial. 16 9
However, despite the Lively court's commendable efforts to guaran-
tee that Pennsylvania courts admit only reliable statements as substan-
tive evidence and to ensure that the courts have clear-cut guidance for
judging statement reliability, the Lively decision suffers from two short-
comings. First, the Lively decision did not explicitly adopt a personal
knowledge requirement. Second, while the Lively decision addresses the
types of prior inconsistent statements that may be admitted as substantive
evidence, the decision fails to articulate a test for evaluating the circum-
stances under which the prior statements were rendered. If the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court had adopted a personal knowledge requirement
and "reliability of circumstances" criteria, the court could have effec-
tively furthered its goal of excluding unreliable prior inconsistent state-
ments from evidence.
At least two states and two commentators have advocated imposing
a personal knowledge requirement on the substantive admissibility of
prior inconsistent statements. 170 A personal knowledge requirement
would serve to exclude from evidence all prior inconsistent statements
that merely narrate a third person's statements, unless the witness also
had personal knowledge of the subject matter of the third person's state-
ments. 17' Thus, the personal knowledge requirement would provide
for a more fruitful line of cross-examination, because "only a witness
with personal knowledge of the subject matter of a prior inconsistent
statement can be cross-examined about whether the statement is
truthful." 172
In addition to imposing a personal knowledge requirement, the
Lively court should also have formulated a list of criteria for the lower
courts to use in determining whether the circumstances under which a
declarant rendered his or her prior inconsistent statement were free
from coercion. In Lively, the court carefully examined the circumstances
under which Ms. Traxler made her prior inconsistent statement in
Brady. 17 3 The court decided that because Ms. Traxler's mother and at-
torney were present when Ms. Traxler made her statement, and because
Ms. Traxler's attorney had advised her of "her rights and options," Ms.
Traxler's statement was highly reliable. 174 However, none of the admis-
169. Commonwealth v. Lively, 610 A.2d 7, 10 (Pa. 1992).
170. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 27, at 1584-1588 (suggesting advisability
of adopting personal knowledge requirement and discussing Professor McCor-
mick's proposal for admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, which includes
personal knowledge requirement). For the text of Illinois and Connecticut's
rules of evidence, both of which require the element of personal knowledge, see
supra notes 149-50.
171. Graham, supra note 27, at 1585.
172. Id. The personal knowledge requirement would also "exclude[] from
evidence those statements most open to fabrication." Id. at 1585.
173. Lively, 610 A.2d at 9.
174. Id.
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sibility criteria adopted in Lively addresses the circumstances under
which a prior inconsistent statement was rendered.' 75 Instead, the
Lively criteria are aimed at ensuring that prior statements are supported
by extrinsic proof.176 Even statements supported by extrinsic proof,
however, may lack reliability.
For example, a prior inconsistent statement that is supported by ex-
trinsic proof might still have been "the product of coercion or pressure
exerted by the police, or other interested parties."' 77 The risk that
prior inconsistent statements might be the product of coercion
prompted the New Jersey courts to develop a fifteen-factor test for as-
sessing the reliability of prior statements and the circumstances under
which the statements were made.' 78 Like Pennsylvania, a prior inconsis-
tent statement must be recorded, reduced to a signed writing or given
under oath to be admissible as substantive evidence in the New Jersey
courts.179 But in NewJersey, ajudge must also evaluate the reliability of
a prior inconsistent statement according to a "reliability of circum-
stances" checklist. 180 This checklist includes some of the following fac-
tors: the declarant's motivation to fabricate; the presence or absence of
any pressures, inducement or coercion; whether the declarant was in
custody; whether the declarant was a target of the investigation; the
mental and physical condition of the declarant; and whether the state-
ment was supported by corroborating evidence. 18 1 The New Jersey
Supreme Court has asserted that imposing a "totality of the circum-
stances" test on the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is es-
sential to ensuring the "voluntary, reliable nature" of the prior
inconsistent statements admitted at trial.i 82 Imposing such a require-
ment in Pennsylvania would undoubtedly have a similar effect.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court may already have implicitly
adopted a "reliability of circumstances" requirement. Although the
Lively court never explicitly adopted such a requirement, the court in
Burgos treated the "unreliable" circumstances under which six-year-old
Jerry Michael Burgos rendered his prior inconsistent statements as an
175. For a discussion of the limitations the Lively court imposed on the sub-
stantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, see supra notes 85-118
and accompanying text.
176. Lively, 610 A.2d at 9.
177. Kelly A. Kutler, Note, The Admission of Prior Inconsistent Statements as Sub-
stantive Evidence - Commonwealth v. Brady, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 427, 441 (1987).
178. See State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107, 1116 (N.J. 1991) (imposing fif-
teen-factor inquiry into circumstances in which prior inconsistent statement was
rendered due to "specter of illicit coercion" and "damning nature" of such
statements). For a discussion of New Jersey's fifteen factor inquiry, see supra
note 148.
179. Mancine, 590 A.2d at 1115.
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important factor in its decision to reverse Burgos' conviction.18 3 How-
ever, given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's brief treatment of the
"reliability of circumstances" test in Burgos, the status of this inquiry re-
mains unclear. Given the potentially damaging nature of prior inconsis-
tent statements and the "specter of illicit coercion" that surrounds
them, courts should be obligated to consider the circumstances sur-
rounding the rendering of a witness' statement.'
8 4
VI. CONCLUSION
By imposing limitations on the substantive admissibility of prior in-
consistent statements, the Lively court sought to ensure that Penn-
sylvania courts only admit reliable prior inconsistent statements as
substantive evidence. To achieve this goal, the court set forth a new rule
limiting the types of prior inconsistent statements that may be intro-
duced as substantive evidence at trial.' 85 Under the Lively rule, Penn-
sylvania courts may admit three types of prior inconsistent statements:
1) statements given under oath at formal legal proceedings; 2) state-
ments reduced to writings signed and adopted by the declarant; and 3)
statements recorded verbatim contemporaneously with their
rendering. 1
86
The Lively decision accomplishes two important tasks. First, the
Lively rule excludes many potentially unreliable prior inconsistent state-
ments from evidence. Whereas the Brady rule permitted the substantive
use of unsubstantiated oral statements, the Lively rule limits the types of
prior inconsistent statements that may be introduced as substantive evi-
dence to those supported by extrinsic evidence.' 8 7 Second, by explicitly
setting forth the three types of prior inconsistent statements admissible
as substantive evidence, the Lively court has provided an invaluable evi-
dentiary checklist for the lower courts.
However, the Lively court did not go far enough in accomplishing
either of these two important tasks. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
should further restrict the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements by imposing a personal knowledge requirement.' 8 8 Declar-
ants who lack personal knowledge of the subject matter of a prior incon-
sistent statement cannot be effectively cross-examined about the truth of
183. Commonwealth v. Burgos, 610 A.2d 11, 14 (Pa. 1992). For a discus-
sion of the circumstances in which Jerry Michael Burgos rendered his prior in-
consistent statement, see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
184. Mancine, 590 A.2d at 1116.
185. For a discussion of the Lively rule, see supra notes 85-118 and accom-
panying text.
186. Commonwealth v. Lively, 610 A.2d 7, 8 (Pa. 1992).
187. For a comparison of the Brady and Lively rules, see supra notes 160-65
and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of the reasons for adopting a personal knowledge re-
quirement, see supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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the statement. Additionally, the court should impose an obligatory in-
quiry into the circumstances under which a prior inconsistent statement
was rendered and should clearly articulate the criteria a court should
utilize when evaluating those circumstances. 189 Such an inquiry would
ensure the voluntary, reliable nature of witnesses' prior inconsistent
statements. Together, these additional limitations, on substantive ad-
missibility would further the court's goal of ensuring that only state-
ments possessing strong indicia of reliability are admitted at trial.
Jeanine M. Kasulis
189. For a discussion of the "circumstances" inquiry implemented by the
New Jersey courts, see supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
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